First Army's commander Kenneth Anderson, seemed determined to match Fredendall's micro-management, withholding Combat Command B until finally releasing it on the 15th.The brigade-sized formation spent the 16th moving toward Sbeitla in two columns arriving late that night. They established positions by mid-afternoon three miles east of Sbeitla, while Combat Command A tried to disengage from the enemy and cover Combat Command B’s left flank. The rear guard had done a fine job of buying them time, but First Army continued to equivocate about how strongly Sbeitla was to be held, if it would be abandoned to the enemy and if so, when the pullout was to occur.

A reconnaissance by fire during the previous night caused panic in Combat Command A, and a number of its troops, including their commander, retreated without orders. American engineers doing demolition work sent most of their men toward the fight, while a scratch force under Lt. Col. Hightower held their ground. The sudden appearance of a large number of enemy vehicles, coupled with the loud demolition explosions, convinced the Germans that a counterattack had begun, so they paused their own attack until daylight. While Combat Command A fled the scene, Combat Command B, having seen almost constant combat since late October, fought off repeated the German assaults.

Meanwhile, First Army and II Corps headquarters disagreed all night about abandoning Sbeitla until the corps finally received an order to hold until at least 1100. They held until 1430 before starting an orderly withdrawal that held the enemy at bay for another two and a half hours. Ernie Pyle was on hand to witness this “damned humiliating” retreat and afterwards wrote “You need feel no shame . . . American soldier . . . The deeper he gets into a fight, the more of a fighting man he becomes.” While written to appease readers back home, the next two weeks would prove him right.

Update of 1st edition scenario 28 "Combat Command B holds Steady."