To improve their defensive positions the Germans launched a major operation late on January 18th aimed at controlling the four main gaps through the Eastern Dorsals, which conveniently controlled the Tunis water supply. After faking an attack against the British, they wheeled to strike the ill-equipped French and broke into the Ousseltia Valley. At 1715 on the 19th Col. Paul Robinett received orders to lead his Combat Command B into the valley to rectify the situation. The Germans controlled the valley by the time Robinett arrived at Maktar on the 20th. He lined up his artillery support, then conducted a treacherous road march, delaying his attack until the afternoon of the following day.

Robinett’s attack showed that Combat Command B was learning from its previous mistakes. Instead of racing willy-nilly down the road into the fire of waiting enemy anti-tank guns, the tankers waited until the supporting artillery began softening up the enemy with their fire missions and air support roared inbound. Then they advanced under control and remained organized when engaged by a platoon of Tiger tanks. While they didn’t achieve all their objectives, they pushed Lueder's battle group back far enough to open up an escape route for the French fighting to the north. This new discipline led to the 501st Heavy Panzer Detachment mistaking them for British. The day did not bring laurels for CCB but they did their job well enough, and remained combat ready for the next day.

Update of 1st edition scenario 13.