During this time period, General Pietro Maravigna had a reputation as a knowledgeable military historian and expert on doctrinal and strategic subjects. Marshal Badoglio entrusted Maravigna, appointed to command the Second Corps, with the task of enveloping Ras Imirrù's army in the Scirè region of Ethiopia. The Marshal intended for this action take place within the framework of a larger maneuver he planned to isolate and annihilate the enemy. Exploiting one of the rare existing motor roads, Maravigna deployed his advancing troops in more of a “procession” than as an advancing army, without relying on scouting or on reconnaissance at all. He dispensed with such precautions because aerial reconnaissance signaled that the avenue of advance lacked potential threats. Being a skilled commander and well-advised by local clergymen, Ras Imirrù saw the opportunity to bloody the Italians' noses. He ordered his most reliable forces to conceal themselves and await the advancing enemy.

Ras Imirrù's men ambushed the Gavinana Division’s vanguard, which quickly became disordered. Reinforcements from the division eventually drove off the Ethiopians after several hours of heavy fighting. Especially ironic, given Maravigna’s reliance on “modern” warfare, at one point the division was forced to form a 19th-century square with their artillery on the corners to cover all flanks against encirclement. As the battle surged the artillery often fired point blank into the mass of combatants, regardless of whether it contained friendly or enemy troops. The battle took Maravigna completely by surprise, who never realized Ras Imirrù planned this as a rearguard action to cover his withdrawal. In any case, he stopped his “fast” advance until the 2nd of March, drastically upsetting Badoglio and his plan. Thanks to the respite, Ras Imirrù, despite the heavy losses, escaped with a majority of his army. The rearguard launched further counterattacks which were checked by heavy artillery fire from the entire Second Corps. After the Second World War the two Italian generals, while writing their memoirs, accused each other of incompetence and poor leadership throughout the campaign. However, both agreed that Ras Imirrù possessed superior command qualities.