Aircraft

[campsawyer]

I understand the rational for the weak chances for success with them, but if they weren't such a factor why include them in the scenarios.

[Hugmenot]

Maybe because while they weren't such a factor over the course on the war, they were a factor on a specific day/encounter.

They're also fun to use.

I am curious to see how aircraft will be implemented in modern PG.

[Poor Yorek]

I understand the rational for the weak chances for success with them, but if they weren't such a factor why include them in the scenarios.

Maybe because "weak chance" .NE. "no chance?" Might as well ask why where there is a 1-col on the DF table (the odds of any combat result being worse than the odds of an aircraft striking its intended hex).

[Poor Yorek]

I am not sure what the generals may have feared at that moment.

So you can learn something new today!

Source: Tank Tactics by R. Jarymowycz (Stackpole Military Series)

24 May 1945 interviews with three German generals who had combat experience in Normandy (Sweppenburg; Hausser; Dietrich) and Guderian (who did not) are cited on p. 268. The question regarded what Allied weapon systems were "most feared" by German tank crews (so a question biased towards armored combat) and percentages of losses due to each. All of them cited mechanical failure as the most likely killer of a panzer. None cited air strikes as the "most feared," but rather Allied tanks and tank destroyers. (armor kills armor).

The author also supplies a table, p. 269 (citing a 1951 report of tank losses) that ascribe a 7.5% total of German tank losses to air power (I assume these data are Western Front only). Most of the remainder was equally split between gunfire and "non-enemy action" which I take to mean mechanical failures; driving into a ditch etc.

On Jun 19th, 1944 Guderian sent a report Hitler about tactical problems being faced by the German army in Normandy and the feasibility of reducing the allied beachhead. He sites at least 5 times the problems caused by allied air superiority. He describes the 12th SS and 21st Pz divisions as being "severely hindered". He goes on to say that assembling an attack force of more than 1&1/2 divisions as being impractical.

I suspect that one can find a report from Guderian citing just about anything five times as being problematic. Guderian, Manstein, and the others were not above telling Hitler or their Allied interrogators what they thought they wanted to hear (and to bolster their own egos). Each allied service branch or combat area in the post-war internecine battles was fairly eager to show how they had contributed (or not) to Germany's defeat. Kurt Meyer's recollections (also to be suspected) seem more concerned with naval gunfire than air strike - at least at the tactical (not logistic) level.

In any case, my original point was not to write an analysis on all areas of Allied tactical air power, but to address quickly (based on some documented works) the specific issue of tactical air power's likely role (or lack thereof) on the time/length scale of a typical PG scenario. If I'm riding in an SPW-251 50 miles from the front, I'm worried about aircraft and whether the driver had too much snapps; 1000m from the front, I'm probably worried about an Allied anti-tank gun or Sherman popping out of a woods.

[plloyd1010]

So, you dismiss Guderian because he would tell Hitler what he wanted to hear. It seems there is another book you haven't read yet. Guderian was removed from command in late '42 because he often told Hitler what he thought. Also because he figured out Hitler's trivia arguments, then beat him at it. It took the treat of mutiny by the army to get him reinstated.

The report I cited, with a name, subject, and date noted, should be available to anyone here who can do 30 seconds of internet digging. The rest of what I said might take upwards of 2 minutes to track down. Check bibliographies and footnotes. Don't dismiss primary sources in favor of bias or someone's rewrites.

Guderian was there because the previous general was strafed (thanks Charlie), on quiet French country road, 80-90 hexes from the battlefield. The 12th SS and 21st Panzer were not 50 miles behind the line, the were the line.

The original issue had to do with the effectiveness of aircraft in PG, implied, vs. reality. Effective tactical air support was quite devastating to it's targets. Often incapacitating them for hours, even days. The rapid advances across France (both ways) and into Russia would not have been as dramatic, is places not even possible, without tactical air support. The biggest issues in that support have normally been effective targeting and coordination with the ground.

My take on aircraft in PG is that they are undervalued. I suspect this due game requirements. PG is a ground game, deciding the results outside that scope. Certainly for me, I don't really want to win on a die roll, I want to win because good tactics. If I lose, I want it to be because the other guy was better, not luckier, than I.

[plloyd1010]

BtW I will check the book.

[Shad]

My take in aircraft in PG is that they are under valued. I suspect this due game requirements. PG is a ground game, deciding the results outside that scope. Certainly for me, I don't really want to win on a die roll, I want to win because good tactics. If I lose, I want it to be because the other guy was better, not luckier, than I.

I find this a very believable and satisfying explanation. Well put.

[plloyd1010]

Thanks Drew.

[Poor Yorek]

I didn't "dismiss" Guderian, but I have read enough to know that one does not take Guderian - or for that matter most of the other German generals interviewed post war - simply at their word: one should read them critically as they were men motivated by virtue as well as vice (e.g. Dinardo in "Germany's Panzer Arm in WWII" also by Stackpole, asserts (p. 93) that Guderian tried to appropriate for himself post-war the role of panzer 'guru' at the expense of many others such as Erich von Tschischwitz and Fritz Heigl). One should also note that American generals were wont to argue amongst themselves about their own areas of command (just look at the documented battles over the efficacy of the strategic air campaign that still is debated).

Please also note that whilst I referred to a derivative work, all of the citations I made from that work were themselves citations of primary sources, to which non-specialists or non-academics have little access (or at least require more than just a quick google search). I provided page numbers that include the footnotes that the author cited where all you suggest is an internet search; nor do you refute the data I offered nor offer data in support of a contrary position. All you seem to suggest is that we take Guderian's word for it. So please don't tell me to "check footnotes and bibliographies" - I do that professionally when I have published in the scientific literature.

I don't understand your point about the Hitler Jugend or the 21st panzer at least how it would apply to my admittedly simple (i.e. message board) example? Sure, I used an example of my SPW251 grenadier with two extremes - a range that would clearly be "at the front" - i.e. could expect to come under direct fire - and a range that clearly was "away from the front" - 50 miles was arbitrary, but within tactical air range. If you wish to remonstrate about 2000m, 5000m, or some other "grey area" in between that defines a division's or corps' defense-in-depth, as to what defines "the front" be my guest, but at PG's scale "at the front" I suggest means within proximity to DF or AT. The reference from Jarymowycz supports the claim that when engaged in combat by DF/AT fire at the ranges of PG, German tank crews were worried about Allied AT fire, not so much tactical aircraft. If you have an alternative reference that refutes this claim, then I would welcome being provided the source. I'm not beholden to Jarymowycz's thesis, but I would expect a rebuttal to be as well documented.

[Poor Yorek]

I don't really want to win on a die roll, I want to win because good tactics. If I lose, I want it to be because the other guy was better, not luckier, than I.

But doesn't this define PG? Consider that one tactically arranges an assault on the 30-col against a demoralized INF on the 1-col, but the 30-col rolls a '1' which the other sides passes, yet the DEM-INF rolls a '6' which then demoralizes the tank+HMG+INF which assaulted ... likely, no, but not so rare that I wager all of us have encountered it or the like on any number of occasions.

On average the better tactical player should win more often than the weaker one, but the variance in PG is fairly high at least as I've noted in my 55+ plays (not unlike poker).