Aircraft

[Shad]

I've played four scenarios with aircraft. That's not enough to draw a meaningful conclusion, but certainly enough to get a feel.

My feel? Aircraft are at best an amusing footnote to my battles, at worst an occasional interruption for several futile dice tosses.

Has anyone ever played a scenario where aircraft played a memorable role in deciding the outcome of the battle? If yes, I'd love to hear about it.

At this point they're one notch away from going on my "absolutely no impact on whether I choose this scenario or not" list...

[Poor Yorek]

See my AAR for BlkSS027. It was just a single aircraft attack, but with a 2-ATF valued Typhoon and a good eye, some PzIVF2's went up in smoke. As I wrote: "the US cheered Tommy!" A small, but dramatic moment (might not have changed the outcome, but certainly allowed the US to be more aggressive in the attack).

I'd value aircraft intensely in a scenario where (1) I faced significant on-board artillery/mortars stacked up in a large woods/town where they otherwise might not be spotted unless a unit could be moved adjacent; (2) to harass fleeing DEM units especially when my own were tied down in assaults or were blocked by LT. Essentially OBA with eagle-eyes ... not to be dismissed lightly.

[campsawyer]

Poor's story is similar in recent game. One Sturmovik took out a 1/2 a StugIII platoon, but this was the first attack that got passed the "Hit Target" stage. The prior three scenarios had planes but all fail "To hit" the target. This was not unique to either side, German, Russian or American.

With planes I have considered two options for increasing effectiveness, change the "To hit" roll to be more like bombardment. Where Germans and 1944 and beyond would miss on "1" and pre-1944 non-Germans would miss on "1" or "2". The second item is to treat non-AT attacks as bombardment rather than direct fire.

I have only considered these not actually tried them. If someone is interested in trying I would love to here the feedback.

[Shad]

I wonder if we have any WW2 Air armchair experts in our ranks? I'd love to see someone really dive into the records and come up with some serious performance/combat effectiveness data for application within PG. I've read lots of accounts on Wikipedia about the power of anti-AFV aircraft attack, particularly late war Eastern Front, but that's certainly never been true on MY game table!

[Matt W]

Given the current rules, aircraft is substantially more effective against artillery or cavalry than AFVs, expecially if the unit has only a "1" AT factor. I have found aircraft to be very annoying to on board artillery and it was effective against Daniel's Ecuadorian cavalry in the last scenario of WotE.

[plloyd1010]

I've played Roosevelt's Luttwaffe (or something like that) a while back. The errant planes did a lot of damage to the rather green American troops. Overall the planes in the game don't have nearly the effect sited in most historical depictions.

[Poor Yorek]

I wonder if we have any WW2 Air armchair experts in our ranks? I'd love to see someone really dive into the records and come up with some serious performance/combat effectiveness data for application within PG. I've read lots of accounts on Wikipedia about the power of anti-AFV aircraft attack, particularly late war Eastern Front, but that's certainly never been true on MY game table!

I seem to recall a few authors citing interviews with German generals regarding the Normandy campaign: air power was fairly low on their list of what was "most feared." Of course, what I'd like to have done is interviewed logistical staff officers to find out whether they concur with the guys with the gold braid on their shoulders! I might try to document those works when I get home.

That being said, my naive guess is that at the combat length scale of PG, tactical air power was relatively a minor factor: put alternatively, tactical air power was mostly directed to attacks at supply areas; assembly areas; interdiction of transport & roads/bridges, etc., behind the lines of the tactical combat of the scenarios. That is, air power has already been felt in establishing the OOB and any supply special rules that are applicable. "Close" air support perhaps was too fraught with friendly fire concerns to be applicable to tactical combat at the ranges of PG? By this, I don't mean to suggest that it was never done, I just suggest that might be the reason why air power is seldom a "significant" factor in PG scenarios. I guess the other simple possibility is that APL selects actions in which tactical air power was not a significant factor simply to focus on actions in which ground combat operations were predominant and decisive.

[JayTownsend]

As stated before, I like aircraft for attacking rear out of LOS artillery/mortars but the AT aircraft have been nice so far for taking out armor. Overall, with the exception of a couple of scenarios, not too game changing but those few that were, hurt. I am glad they don't rule the battlefield too much however.

[larry marak]

I think Poor Yorek is right on the money. In the TIME scale of actions in PG, a plane crosses 25 hexes in 1/6th to 1/10th of a game turn. An aerial attack is an extremely brief event in a game. Now shooting up a truck convoy or a train is something else, but so far we have no armored train vs fighter-bomber scenarios. Remember (if you saw it) the attack on the German supply train in Red Tails. On a typical PG battlefield, you're odds of being taken out by a bomb are about the same as being struck by lightning during a battle in a rain storm.

(please forgive the graphic verbal imagery of this post, over at consim world/PG they are calling for my death for a modest suggestion.)

[plloyd1010]

I seem to recall a few authors citing interviews with German generals regarding the Normandy campaign: air power was fairly low on their list of what was "most feared." Of course, what I'd like to have done is interviewed logistical staff officers to find out whether they concur with the guys with the gold braid on their shoulders! I might try to document those works when I get home.

I am not sure what the generals may have feared at that moment. On Jun 19th, 1944 Guderian sent a report Hitler about tactical problems being faced by the German army in Normandy and the feasibility of reducing the allied beachhead. He sites at least 5 times the problems caused by allied air superiority. He describes the 12th SS and 21st Pz divisions as being "severely hindered". He goes on to say that assembling an attack force of more than 1&1/2 divisions as being impractical.

Kesselring insisted the risk of the 15Pzgr division's march to the Anzio breachhead was necessary, despite the possibility of it arriving unable to fight due to losses from the air. If Gen. Lucas had not been in charge of the operation, Kesselring's urgency would have been more than justified.