Aircraft

[Poor Yorek]

I am not sure what the generals may have feared at that moment.

So you can learn something new today!

Source: Tank Tactics by R. Jarymowycz (Stackpole Military Series)

24 May 1945 interviews with three German generals who had combat experience in Normandy (Sweppenburg; Hausser; Dietrich) and Guderian (who did not) are cited on p. 268. The question regarded what Allied weapon systems were "most feared" by German tank crews (so a question biased towards armored combat) and percentages of losses due to each. All of them cited mechanical failure as the most likely killer of a panzer. None cited air strikes as the "most feared," but rather Allied tanks and tank destroyers. (armor kills armor).

The author also supplies a table, p. 269 (citing a 1951 report of tank losses) that ascribe a 7.5% total of German tank losses to air power (I assume these data are Western Front only). Most of the remainder was equally split between gunfire and "non-enemy action" which I take to mean mechanical failures; driving into a ditch etc.

On Jun 19th, 1944 Guderian sent a report Hitler about tactical problems being faced by the German army in Normandy and the feasibility of reducing the allied beachhead. He sites at least 5 times the problems caused by allied air superiority. He describes the 12th SS and 21st Pz divisions as being "severely hindered". He goes on to say that assembling an attack force of more than 1&1/2 divisions as being impractical.

I suspect that one can find a report from Guderian citing just about anything five times as being problematic. Guderian, Manstein, and the others were not above telling Hitler or their Allied interrogators what they thought they wanted to hear (and to bolster their own egos). Each allied service branch or combat area in the post-war internecine battles was fairly eager to show how they had contributed (or not) to Germany's defeat. Kurt Meyer's recollections (also to be suspected) seem more concerned with naval gunfire than air strike - at least at the tactical (not logistic) level.

In any case, my original point was not to write an analysis on all areas of Allied tactical air power, but to address quickly (based on some documented works) the specific issue of tactical air power's likely role (or lack thereof) on the time/length scale of a typical PG scenario. If I'm riding in an SPW-251 50 miles from the front, I'm worried about aircraft and whether the driver had too much snapps; 1000m from the front, I'm probably worried about an Allied anti-tank gun or Sherman popping out of a woods.